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Mass evacuations, particularly those at a statewide level, represent the largest single-
event traffic movements that exist.  These complex events can last several days, cover thousands 
of miles of roadway, and include hundreds of thousands of people and vehicles.  Often, they are 
also marked by enormous delay and congestion and are nearly always criticized for their 
inefficiency and lack of management.  However, there are no standardized methods by which to 
systematically quantify traffic characteristics at the proper scale. This paper describes research 
to develop and apply an analytical method to measure and describe statewide mass-evacuations 
in a practical, cost-effective manner.  The research methods are based on simple, yet widely 
available, and easily understood traffic count datasets that support both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. By spatially and temporally arranging sensor-based statewide traffic 
volume data from Hurricane Irma (2017), Michael (2018), Tubbs Fire (2017), and Thomas Fire 
(2018) evacuations, these methods were able to describe and address several key questions about 
these events.  The methods described herein estimate the start and end of the auto-based 
evacuation, the loading and peaking characteristics of traffic, and the total number of vehicles 
used in the evacuation process, as well as the effective start and end of the auto-based reentry. 
Among the key findings of this work were that the Hurricane Irma and Michael evacuations 
began several days before landfall, peaking two to three days prior to the storm, suggesting a 
v 
heightened perception of risk; and that the Thomas and Tubbs fire evacuations traffic were 
impacted by subsequent fires nearby. It is expected that state departments of transportation and 
emergency management officials would be able to reproduce the procedure presented here to 
analyze future evacuations. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Mass evacuations, particularly those at a statewide level, represent single-event traffic 
movements that can occur. These complex transportation events can last several days, span 
thousands of miles of roadway, and include hundreds of thousands of people and vehicles 
traveling with vital urgency. Often, they are also plagued by enormous travel delay and 
congestion and are nearly always criticized for their inefficiency and lack of management. 
However, there are few studies quantitatively examine such events to objectively asses what 
travel conditions were actually like. Typically, opinions are based on media reports that tend to 
sensationalize poor operations and focus strictly on areas that are performing poorly. 
Unfortunately, there are many reasons why mass evacuations tend to be comprehensively 
studied. Obviously, they are large and complex, but another is that there are no standardized 
methods by which to systematically quantify traffic characteristics at the proper scale. There are 
few indicators, apart from a lack of fatalities and the amount of vehicles moved, to determine if 
any evacuation was “effective” or not. Instead, outside of media reports, emergency managers 
and transportation professionals often work under general assumptions that an evacuation was 
effective if people were able to get out of danger and no one drowned in their homes. 
Purpose Statement 
To provide a basis of measurement and comparison, the study describes research 
undertaken to examine and assess evacuation characteristics. More importantly, the study 
illustrates methods to measure and quantify evacuations in an unbiased, practical, and repeatable 
fashion that is both intuitive and beneficial to state officials. The research methods are based on 
simple, yet widely available, and easily understood traffic count datasets. Traffic volume counts 
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serve as a fundamental parameter of traffic measurement, but they can yield enormous insights 
into the ebb and flow of daily commutes and when, where, how much, and how fast people are 
able to move during an evacuation. These wide area, long term vehicle count can also be used to 
illustrate the movement of evacuees after the hurricane to better understand how many vehicles 
were impacted, when the recovery began, and even how long it took based on when the traffic 
patterns returned to normal. 
Objectives 
Based on these ideas, the objectives of the research are to spatially and temporally 
quantify key aspects of the evacuation and reentry process in Florida and California during the 
record-setting 2017 and 2018 hurricane and wildfire seasons, specifically: 
(i) When did the auto-based evacuation make a measurable impact on traffic (when 
did it noticeably start)? 
(ii) What were the loading characteristics of the evacuating traffic on the network? 
(iii) What was the peak evacuation volume and when did it occur? 
(iv) When did the auto-based evacuation conclude? 
(v) How many vehicles were used in the evacuation? 
(vi) When did the reentry begin? 
(vii) When did reentry effectively conclude? 
These objectives are achieved through the observation and analysis of roadway volumes 
collected from ground-based sensors (predominately, magnetic-loop detectors) during 
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hurricanes and wildfires of 2017-2018 evacuations and reentries in the State of Florida and 
California. These two events provide a unique opportunity to study the evacuation phenomenon 
because they are among the largest in the history of the united States; they affected nearly all of 
the major metropolitan population centers of the state; and traffic volumes are recorded on 
geographic scale and at levels of fidelity rarely achieved in prior evacuation studies. 
Research Contribution 
The scientific contribution of this work is that it demonstrates a straightforward and 
reproducible methodology to measure the auto-based evacuation response and reentry of an area. 
The proposed methods demonstrated in this paper have a significant practical value for state 
transportation and/or emergency management agencies seeking to quickly and accurately assess 
evacuation characteristics.  This research also expands the literature by providing insights into 
the less-often-studied topic of evacuation reentry timing and participation. Finally, it creates a 
set of aggregate evacuation parameters that can be used to calibrate evacuation planning and 
simulation models making the paper a valued reference for future research studies. 
Delimitations and Assumptions 
This study required to filter and set boundaries for the acquired data, since in many of 
these natural disasters there is always a margin of error because of the sensors in the region being 
affected. The acquired full real time data that contained region location, naming, and volume 
information, such as county names, latitudes, longitudes, speed, volume, among others. This data 
was filtered among those sensor-based regions that were unavailable because of the disaster. For 
example, during Michael there were many sensors on the west coast of the State of Florida that 
were not recording data, assuming that these sensors were either malfunctioning because of the 
weather, connection breakage, or damaged. 
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Limitations 
Analysts tend to focus on how the evacuation progressed over time giving importance to 
the topography and infrastructure of the region. The primary limitations that analysts or 
researchers cannot modify, or change is the current transportation network. The network was 
considered and designed for the highest demand, which is most likely not a massive evacuation. 
This study considered the current network, how state’s current and past plans, and most 
importantly how the current evacuations took place.  
Background 
Natural disasters have always been an issue for many countries, according to the Natural 
Hazard Project of the Department of Regional Development and Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance/U.S. Agency for International Development, natural disasters are “naturally 
occurring physical phenomena caused by rapid or slow onset events which can be geophysical, 
hydrological, climatological, meteorological, or biological” (International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies, n.d.). Hurricanes are natural disasters that affect the day-
to-day climate through strong winds and heavy storms, hurricanes are base under a category 
from 1 to 5. These hurricanes form when there is warm ocean water, the weather is moist and 
humid. While the humid air flows up where there is low pressure over the warm ocean water, 
then the water is released from the air as it starts to rotate creating the clouds of the storm shown 
in Figure 5. Wildfires on the other hand, are phenomenon that are unpredictable when it comes 
to location, time, and direction; this is because wildfires depend on the speed of the winds and 
heat temperature. Figure 6 shows the prone areas for wildfires to occur in the State of California.  
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Figure 1. How are hurricanes or tropical cyclones formed. Source: The 
National Hurricane Center. Retrieved on January 20th, 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Florida and California have their season of danger and precautions, which leads to 
evacuations. In 2017, California suffered from four wildfires that spread through Southern 
California leaving more than 30 structures destroyed through its path (Alvarez & Santora, 2017). 
This also includes about 200,000 people had little time to prepare during the 2017 Ventura, 
California wildfire. In 2017, Florida suffered from a category 4 hurricane with maximum wind 
speed of 130 miles per hour destroying about 25% of homes in the Florida Keys, flooding all of 
the coasts in Florida and leaving more than three million Floridians without power (Wall Street 
Journal, 2017). Those two states have a lot in common; their evacuations consist on large 
capacity movements because both are heavy populated states. Even though Florida’s 2017-
hurricane evacuation was considered the biggest evacuation in the United States history, 
California’s wildfire destruction and deaths have been marked in history. 
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Fundamentally, surface transportation seeks to find a balance between supply and 
demand. An increase in the number of vehicles on a road (demand) subsequently leads to an 
increase in congestion and travel time (price), assuming the supply of roads does not change. 
This concept is universal in traffic analysis. In general, the supply of roads is typically governed 
by daily commuting traffic. That is to say, the number of roads servicing an area is usually a 
function of the number of daily commuters needing access to this area. In theory, as the number 
of commuters grow over time, so too should the number/capacity of roads. The delicate balance 
between travel supply and demand leaves communities vulnerable to sudden and drastic 
increases in demand. A spike in demand can lead to excessive congestion with the potential to 
cause network wide gridlock. Such situations occur during road maintenance or special events 
but are most consequential during emergency evacuations. Because roads are design for daily 
commuter traffic, the increase in demand caused by the evacuating public and the potential for 
subsequence gridlock, is a serious problem for transportation officials. 
The 2017 evacuation of Hurricane Irma has been referred to as the largest evacuation in 
the history of the nation with approximately 6.5 million Floridians under mandatory or voluntary 
evacuation orders (Marshall, 2017). Hurricane Irma impacted nearly the entire peninsula and 
its high-powered winds, storm surge, and uniquely unpredictable path caused havoc on the 
Florida roadways. Ultimately, Hurricane Irma made two landfalls within the state of Florida. 
The first was near Cudjoe Key in the lower Florida Keys, on September 10th, 2017 at 
approximately 9:10 AM ET as a Category 4 hurricane with sustained winds of 130 mph (209 
kph) as shown in Figure 1. The second landfall was at approximately 3:35 PM ET near Marco 
Island, just south of Naples, FL as a Category 3 hurricane with winds of 115 mph (161 kph) 
(Jansen, 2017). The storm left approximately 6.7 million homes (65 percent of the state), 
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without power (O'Connor, 2017). Hurricane Irma was attributed to taking the lives of 75 
Floridians and costing an estimated $49 billion (Wile, 2017). The lower Florida Keys remained 
closed to non-residents for approximately three weeks following the storm (Associated Press, 
2017).  
 
Hurricane Michael was category 5 hurricane that made landfall near Mexico Beach, 
Florida on October 10th, 2018 at approximately 12:30 P.M. With sustained wind speeds of 155 
mph (250 kpm), Hurricane Michael was the strongest storm by wind speed to strike the mainland 
U.S. since hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Beven, Berg, & Hagen, 2019). Hurricane Michael was 
directly responsible for 16 deaths and approximately $25 billion in damage. In total, 21 counties 
Figure 2. This figure illustrates the projected track of Hurricane Irma. Picture created by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved on 
December 5th, 2017. 
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issued evacuation orders, of which 12 held mandatory orders in place (Haddad, 2018). However, 
initial reports suggested Hurricane Michael would make landfall as category 3 hurricane, which 
may have had an impact on evacuation participation rates leading up to landfall as shown in 
Figure 3 (Roberson, 2018). Hurricane Michael’s intensity projections 54 hours before landfall 
forecast a Category 1 or Category 2 storm (United States, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA), Nation Hurricane Center, 2018). 
 
  
Figure 3. This figure illustrates the projected track of Hurricane Micheal. Source: National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of Commerce. Retrieved on January 
21st, 2019. 
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Wildfires are generally formed by a high and low pressure usually occurs in mountainous 
areas as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Normally anyone can start a fire with three simple 
things: fuel, oxygen, and heat. Wildfires tend to occur naturally with dry and weather and 
droughts, where green vegetation turns into bone-dry (flammable fuel), with warm temperatures 
(combustion), the strong winds that spreads the fire, and the last ingredient is a spark that can be 
caused by lighting, downed power line, cigarette, among others (Wolters, 2019). The National 
Geographic states that an “average of 72 thousand wildfires cleared an average of 7 million acres 
of the United States”  each year since 2000 (Wolters, 2019). This is said to be double the number 
of acres burnt by wildfires in the previous decade. As population increase causing the additions 
of  homes to the rural and wilderness areas, and the with the climatology changes change making 
the U.S. hotter and drier every year, the more wildfires will occur. According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, wildfires are classified as natural disasters, but about 15 
percent of these occur on their own instead of human causes (Wolters, 2019) 
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Figure 4. The severity of fire hazard zones across the State of California. Source: Copyright: 
Maps of the World 
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One of the most destructive wildfires California had in 2017 was Tubbs Fire. 2017 Tubbs 
Fire has been under investigation since 2017, this fire started October 8th, 2017 around 9:45 p.m. 
and the fire was fully contained on October 31st, 2018. Tubbs Fire destroyed and damaged about 
six thousand structures and caused about 22 deaths as shown in Figure 3 (Cal Fire, 2018). This 
wildfire is categorized as the first most destructive fire in California, until 2018 Thomas Fire 
occurrence. The Tubbs fire started about a quarter mile north of Santa Rosa and began spreading 
south west of Santa Rosa as shown in Figure 3, eventually reaching Santa Rosa by 3:00 a.m. on 
October 9th. More information and timeline on the spread of the Tubbs Fire in the Appendix. 
Figure 5. This figure illustrates how wildfires are formed in California. 
Source: National Weather Service; Storm Prediction Center and USA 
Today. Retrieved on June 13th, 2019. 
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The largest wildfire in California’s history and in 2018 was the Thomas Fire that started 
on November 4th, 2018 and the fire was fully contained on December 15th, 2018. Thomas Fire 
caused about 15 deaths and about two thousand structures were damaged becoming the largest 
wildfire in California’s history (Cal Fire, 2018). Cal Fire estimated that about 177 million 
dollars were spent to fight the Thomas Fire from spreading and containment (Helsel, 2017). 
According to Sommer, the growth of population has been spreading to more fire-prone areas in 
the State of California (Sommer, 2017). As shown in the figure 4, the fire began on north of 
Santa Paula, then started spreading quickly to Ventura, and finally start threatening Ojai Valley 
on December 13th, 2018.  
Figure 6. This figure illustrates the destruction and spreading of the 
Tubbs fire in the Napa and Sonoma County. Source: The Bureau of 
Land Management, Esri, HERE, Garmin, USGS, NGA, EPA, USDA, 
NPS and Cal Fire. Retrieved on June 13th, 2019. 
Key: 
 Structures Destroyed 
Fire Origin 
 Fire Perimeter 
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Figure 7. This figure illustrates the progression of the Thomas Fire in 2018. Source: Ventura County, 
Mapzen, OpenStreetMap. Map perimeter updated as of 4 a.m. on Dec. 11. Retrieved on June 10th, 
2019. 
Key: 
 Fire Perimeter 
Fire Origin 
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Chapter II 
Review of the Relevant Literature 
  The design, implementation, planning, and research of evacuations in Florida and 
California are very significant to the residences of this state and the future of keeping our 
population safe from any global climatological events that may occur. The overall topic of using 
the sensor-based data and developing a quantifying system from a temporal and spatial analysis 
is to be analyze how the evacuation plan was effective, how evacuees move over time and 
quantifying the amount of time that was take to evacuate after or before evacuation orders as 
well as for the reentry. Given the issue observing how effective were the orders, evacuations, 
and reentry plans in order to evacuate a big population in a short amount of time. 
 Understanding the impact of Hurricane Irma, Michael, and Wildfires on the evacuation 
process within Florida and California can provide insights for future storms and evacuation 
events. The fundamentals for the analysis, the supply and demand of vehicles and roads is 
universal within the transportation sciences. Therefore, the results and insights gained here can 
benefit future traffic, urban, and disaster management planners. The State of Florida has not seen 
any major destruction as seen during Hurricane Irma in 2017 and Michael in 2018, since 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Similarly, California has not had a major wildfire disaster with 
numerous fatalities since the Cedar Fire (San Diego County) in 2003. This analysis will help 
FDOT and LADOT be better prepared for a massive evacuation when time is needed. Also 
educate residents how traffic works, especially how the preparations for selecting evacuation 
routes. For the development of this research, several areas of prior literature in specific regions, 
special events and emergency planning, sensor-based and empirical studies on manual traffic 
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control were read and implemented in this study. The following sections of this chapter will 
discuss these elements in further detail. 
Traffic Analysis and Modeling Literature  
The spatial and temporal patterns tend to help explore the traffic volume patterns of  some 
secondary and low volume roadways that occurred in Florida during Hurricane Irma. This study 
matches the study done in Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, which the researchers collected 
hourly traffic volume at each station for all of August 2005 (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). 
According to Wolshon and McArdle, “statistical testing was also used to quantitatively discern 
the volume patterns associated with the evacuation and reentry” of the volume collected. 
Statistical testing was valuable when there was low traffic routine volume or considerably 
volume variation (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). Through the Flow Rate versus Days statistical 
graph analysis are used to determine the different peaks that suggest different traffic situations. 
Westbound traffic volume lanes of Louisiana State Highway 28 (LA 28) shows that the “traffic 
counts on secondary roads had volume peaks starting and ending later could suggest a travel 
time lag as evacuees moved north” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). The study observes the traffic 
patterns that includes the origin and destination while using the location and direction of the 
evacuees. In addition, this observation done by Wolshon and McArdle studied the volumes 
around the cities and major roads, such as the ones done in this analysis. 
Many studies identify evacuation volumes to compare the volumes from the previous 
week of the evacuation, such as Li, Ozbay, Bartin, Iyer, and Canegie’s research from 2013. This 
paper’s methodology consisted in using automatic traffic count data from the toll booths during 
Hurricane Irene to develop empirical response curves for a single county in New Jersey (Li, 
Ozbay, Bartin, Iyer, & Carnegie, Empirical Evacuation Response Curve During Hurricane Irene 
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in cape May County, New Jersey, 2013). This is similar to our graphical analysis for the counties 
in Florida and California, volumes were used and directions from the sensor-based data. Also, 
the studies identifies the evacuation traffic starting about six hours before the mandatory 
evacuation order for the barrier islands, which our analysis considers a good variable to quantify 
the amount of evacuees in both the evacuation and reentry. In addition, the overall quick response 
to a mandatory evacuation order was detected during the observed time, which they assumed 
that it could be due to the large tourist population in the area (Li, Ozbay, Bartin, Iyer, & Carnegie, 
Empirical Evacuation Response Curve During Hurricane Irene in cape May County, New Jersey, 
2013). Li and Ozbay furthered their research in their spatial exposure and data that contained 
weigh-in-motion stations and historical travel time data (Li & Ozbay, Hurricane Irene 
Evacuation Traffic Patterns in New Jersey, 2014). As a result of this data, the analyst observed 
that the overall evacuation took approximately 36 hours where the evacuation traffic was mostly 
shown near the shore, inclining that the evacuees moved west instead of north along the shore 
(Li & Ozbay, Hurricane Irene Evacuation Traffic Patterns in New Jersey, 2014). In comparison 
to Hurricane Sandy, the volumes were lower than Hurricane Irene’s, but with similar spatial 
patterns (Li, Ozbay, & Bartin, Effects of Hurricanes Irene and Sandy in New Jersey: Traffic 
Patterns and Highway Disruptions During Evacuations, 2015). 
Li et al. developed a system for communities threatened by hurricanes that computed the 
Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) (Lindell & Prater, Critical Behavioral Assumptions in 
Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis for Private Vehicles: Examples from Hurricane Research 
and Planning, 2007). This computation requires analysts to create sophisticated models of 
evacuation flows (Lindell & Prater, Critical Behavioral Assumptions in Evacuation Time 
Estimate Analysis for Private Vehicles: Examples from Hurricane Research and Planning, 2007). 
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This study presents the “principal behavioral variables affecting hurricane ETEs, which provides 
recommendations and describes the available empirical data relevant to the ETE models” for 
future research and more effective analytical methods (Lindell & Prater, Critical Behavioral 
Assumptions in Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis for Private Vehicles: Examples from 
Hurricane Research and Planning, 2007). 
The prior studies related to the amount of time residents were away from the evacuation 
zones have yet not been studied, except for the study done by Lindell, Kang, and Prater in their 
Natural Hazard publication. Their study concluded that Hurricane Lili (Category 4), the second 
costliest and strongest hurricane in 2002, where the average duration of time away from home 
was approximately two and half days (Lindell, Kang, & Prater, the Logistics of Household 
Hurricane Evacuation, 2011), whereas Hurricane Katrina (Category 5) in 2005, the average was 
about two weeks (Wu, Lindell, & Prater, 2012). This proposes that the amount of time residents 
are away can vary in many different situations and states, which could be consider by the amount 
of damage, emergency response ability, and utilities to the households. 
Meteorologists have found a pattern by analyzing all hurricanes that have gone or gotten 
close to Florida and most of them have taken the path of the coasts (East and West) or center of 
the state coming from the south and affecting the entire state. According to Brian Wolshon 
(P.h.D., P.E.) and Ben McArdle, “this trend is expected to continue as a global climatological 
patterns are forecast to result in a long-term period of highly active and threatening tropical 
weather within the Atlantic Basin”, this was written for Hurricane Katrina regional evacuation 
and with this in mind the FDOT and the state government need an ultimate evacuation plan for 
the most massive and threatening hurricane possible (Wolshon & McArdle, 2011). With this 
previous research, this study is able to investigate the patterns taken from the biggest hurricane 
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evacuation that the state of Florida has ever had and pass along the information to make specific 
arrangements and improvements. 
There are categorizations of different traffic conditions such as contraflow, maximum 
and minimum flow volumes. For Hurricane Katrina the statistical data analysis on the Wolshon’s 
paper, states that “maximum sustainable flow under evacuation conditions are important because 
they are often used” (Wolshon B. , Empirical Characterization of Mass Evacuation Traffic Flow, 
2008). This study consists of using detector data to investigate different aspects of an evacuation 
for future planning, as seen in many other studies. In addition, the “forecast that the times were 
required to clear locations on the basis of combinations of population size, the response rate, and 
the available roadway capacity” are important to the categorization of different traffic conditions 
(Wolshon B. , Empirical Characterization of Mass Evacuation Traffic Flow, 2008). Wolshon 
used this data collected during Hurricane Katrina to evaluate how well the Highway Capacity 
Manual (HCM) maximum capacities matched the detector reported flows for the different 
roadway networks in Louisiana. The different types of roadway networks consist in contraflow 
freeway segments, freeways operating in the normal direction, four-lane arterial roadways, and 
two-lane arterials. The conclusion to this study was that the maximum flows on these types of 
roadways were lower than the theoretical values of the HCM (Wolshon B. , Empirical 
Characterization of Mass Evacuation Traffic Flow, 2008). 
Evacuations are needed in a state of emergency; hurricanes that form close to Florida are 
most likely to develop into extremely strong hurricanes with wind speed of more than 90 mph. 
In the case of an evacuation, the state government declares publicly a state of emergency when 
hurricanes are a category 4 or more. According to Boyd, Wolshon, and Heerden, understanding 
the relationship between emergency communication and response is important for “disaster 
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planning and response” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). In Florida Governor Rick Scott 
communicated that Florida was in a state of emergency after predictions were given that 
hurricane Irma was going to make its course through the entire peninsula, from the Keys to 
Tallahassee. Similarly, to the impact that the states’ warning announcements made on the spatial 
and temporal movement of the evacuation traffic in Louisiana, Florida’s warnings of different 
evacuation zones impacted the spatial and temporal movement of the evacuation traffic 
(Wolshon, Boyd, & Heerden, 2009). The impact that Florida had through these announcements 
were bigger than Louisiana’s because Florida has only one way to evacuate when the 
announcements stated that the populations needed to be away from the coasts. Since Florida is a 
peninsula, the only way to evacuate for such a massive dangerous hurricane is north, were how 
the population evacuated from East to West and South to North by the predictions of the 
meteorologists, states announcements, and the media can be analyzed. Many people stayed in 
their homes rather than evacuate and “the role of effective risk communications, both long term 
and immediately prior to landfall, cannot be emphasized” when there is a higher risk of losing 
people during such a major evacuation in Florida, California, and North Carolina. 
Communication is extremely important during emergency evacuations that “[n]ot only can 
accurate information mean the difference between life and death, [but] it can provide reassurance 
[and guidance] that response and recovery are truly underway” (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency). The type of governor evacuation order is “emerged as a statistically 
significant predictor of evacuation behavior and expectation notice” as said in previously in this 
paper (Thompson, Garfin, & Silver, 2016).  
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Through global climatological patterns, studies have found that there will be a “long-
term period of highly active and threatening tropical weather” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). 
According to this paper, about 36-38 hours are needed to evacuate the population in New Orleans 
through the traffic volumes analysis, which is also what the Corps of Engineers (CoE) estimated 
to be 72 hours. Just as the traffic volume data was used in the New Orleans Hurricane analysis, 
on the Irma analysis helps illustrate the effects of the Irma evacuation plan on the “roadway 
infrastructure in both spatial and temporal terms” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). The temporal 
analyses evaluate the “movement of traffic over time to assess the apparent starting and ending 
times of the evacuation, estimated travel time, the impact of contraflow operations, and the 
relationship of these parameters to [the] routine conditions” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). 
Temporal pattern has an evacuation timeline and temporal traffic movements across the state of 
Florida, this will keep track of the storm compared to the traffic volumes shown in the dataset 
that was acquired. Similarly, the time that residents take to get from the threat zone to the safe 
zone shows when the evacuation needs to begin and end; it also predicts if the evacuation was 
effective or not. As it states the “primary goal of many transportation agencies is to measure and 
minimize travel time in evacuations” (Wolshon & McArdle, 2009). Our investigation and data 
acquire the idea of an “Evacuation flow”, where the evacuation volume flow volume “increased 
above and returned to (or went below)” the normal historical average. On the other hand, the 
spatial analyses evaluates the “impact of the extent of traffic dispersion” and “its terms of 
roadway functional classification and in contrast to the evacuation” to the prior year (Wolshon 
& McArdle, 2009). 
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Analyzing graphs for spatial-temporal patterns can suggest many traffic situations as 
well, it is helpful to show conditions at particular points and times along the routes (Wolshon & 
Dixit, Traffic Modeling and Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012). 
The method of organizing the traffic volume versus day/time of the data set was done by the 
analysis that Wolshon and Dixit put together in the Hurricane Katrina evacuation research 
papers. According to Wolshon and Dixit, “[e]arly studies to apply to traffic simulation for 
evacuation were limited in their geographical scales and time duration”, this will help the 
research be more specific when helping FDOT (Wolshon & Dixit, Traffic Modeling and 
Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012). 
After Hurricane Andrew there were many researchers that analyzed the “maximum 
hourly rate on a uniform roadway section during a given time under prevailing” (Dixit & 
Wolshon, 2014). According to Dixit and Wolshon, there are two measures that are introduced 
“maximum evacuation flow rates (MEFR)” and “maximum sustainable evacuation flow rates 
(MSEFR)” (Wolshon & Dixit, Traffic Modeling and Simulation for Regional Multimodal 
Evacuation Analysis, 2012). MEFR is “found to peak to a maximum value for a brief period and 
then drop[s] to flow rates that are able to be sustained for several hours as inflow is sufficient to 
saturate the evacuation route” (peak max shown in the graphs of this analysis) and MSEFR is 
“defined as sustainable flows that are observed for greater than or equal to one hour” (Dixit & 
Wolshon, 2014). The reasons for these capacity drops are hypothesized by Brilon et al. (2005) 
to be bottlenecks and different driver behavior. Bottlenecks are defined as “[t]he flow at the point 
under investigation [that] remains fluent until the section between this point and the bottleneck 
is filled with congested flow” subsequently “the maximum flow will be the bottleneck’s 
capacity”. On the other hand, different driver behavior is defined as the “drivers [that are] in 
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fluent traffic accept shorter headways since they expect to be able to pass the vehicles in front”, 
“[o]nce they have given up this idea, they switch to a more safety-conscious style of driving and 
keep longer headways” (Dixit & Wolshon, 2014). 
Analyzing graphs for spatial-temporal patterns can suggest many traffic situations as 
well, it is helpful to show conditions at particular points and times along the routes (Wolshon & 
Dixit, Traffic Modeling and Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012). 
The method of organizing the traffic volume versus day/time of the data set was done by the 
analysis that Wolshon and Dixit put together in the Hurricane Katrina evacuation research 
papers. According to Wolshon and Dixit, “[e]arly studies to apply to traffic simulation for 
evacuation were limited in their geographical scales and time duration”, this will help the 
research be more specific when helping FDOT (Wolshon & Dixit, Traffic Modeling and 
Simulation for Regional Multimodal Evacuation Analysis, 2012). 
South Miami coastal evacuations for Hurricane Irma were done on Wednesday, 
September 6th, 2017, prior to the landfall on Saturday the 9th and mandatory evacuation warnings 
were communicated on Thursday the 7th. When evacuating from coast areas in Florida, there 
are not many alternatives for routing the population, just like evacuating from the Keys, Miami 
Beach, Palm Beach areas, and among others can only take certain evacuation routings. These 
areas have a very particular geographic shape and roadway network for entering and exiting 
these zones (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). These 
barrier islands on the coast are “relatively low-elevation islands [that] lie off much of the Atlantic 
and Gulf Coastline and expose large numbers of their residents to storm surge risk from 
hurricanes” (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). Many of 
our analysis that end up with high traffic volume are due to these areas on the coast of the state 
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of Florida, since evacuees tend to delay their departure from when the evacuation orders are 
given, which causes “traffic surges [that] occur resulting in gridlock on several evacuation 
routes” (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). The meaning 
of evacuation orders are to “allow clearance time for traffic to get past bottlenecks like bridges 
and roads with limited traffic capacity” (Sadri, Ukkusuri, Ph.D., Murray-Tuite, Ph.D., & 
Gladwin, Ph.D., 2014). 
 California’s wildfire impacts have left many deaths and damage across the State of 
California. California has two unique winds that occur at the end of the year called the Diablo 
Winds and the Santa Ana Winds, since vegetation is dried out from the summer season these 
winds will pick up and wildfires will start appearing. Since California is a desert state, the dry 
heat affects the winds and create these fires. According to Beloglazov, Almashor, Abebe, 
Richter, and Barton Steer, the biggest factor in these traffic analysis models are “the departure 
time of evacuees – the time when they leave their point of origin- which depends on their 
awareness, beliefs and priorities”. The reason for these models to be analyzed are in general for 
any type of evacuation, the resident’s behaviors have a heavy effect on the congestion of any 
roadway system (Beloglazov, Almashor, Abebe, Richter, & Barton Steer, 2016). This is where 
the spatial and temporal patterns take place, depending on those behaviors and decision making 
after the influence of mass media, governors’ announcements, and department of transportation 
evacuation routes. 
 Every state has their own mechanism and planning associated to their specific 
topography, population, demand, and infrastructure. Li, Cova, and Dennison’s study is on a GIS 
Model for traffic analysis. The purpose of this study is to “improve on previous methods by 
coupling fire and traffic simulation models to set triggers”, which will allow analysts and 
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planners to estimate the time needed to evacuate using a traffic simulation model (Li, Cova, & 
Dennison, Setting Wildfire Evacuation Trigger Coupling Fire and Traffi Simulation Models: A 
Spatiotemporal GIS Application, 2018). The literature presents that the “time required to 
guarantee that 95% of the evacuating residents arrive at the safe area as a fire approaches a 
community is estimated at 160 minutes for one scenario but 292 minutes if the travel demand is 
doubled” (Li, Cova, & Dennison, Setting Wildfire Evacuation Trigger Coupling Fire and Traffi 
Simulation Models: A Spatiotemporal GIS Application, 2018).  
 Conversely, the studies done in the California region are observing the critical zones of 
danger through geographical information systems (GIS). According to Chou, two of the 
“hypothetical spatial strategies of prescribed burning were evaluated in terms of their 
effectiveness in reducing the danger to the district from fire and producing a more desirable 
spatial pattern” in case of an evacuation (Chou, 2007). This study was analyzing the data of the 
Idyllwild 7-5 minutes quadrangle in the Southern region of California where a probability model 
was constructed (Chou, 2007). This probability model included vegetation, topography, 
precipitation, temperature, proximity to buildings and transportation to generate the distribution 
of fire to occur (Chou, 2007). 
 The creation of evacuation warning zones for wildfires characterized by data-driven 
spatial modeling is important in the literature and methods behind the purpose. As stated in Li’s 
dissertation, from the University of Utah, “[i]n wildfire evacuation practices, incident 
commanders use prominent geographic features (e.g., rivers, roads, and ridgelines) as trigger 
points, such that when a fire crosses a feature, the selected protective action recommendation 
will be issued to the residents at risk” (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-
Environmental System Using Triggers, 2016).  This study examines the “dynamics of evacuation 
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timing by coupling wildfire spread modeling, trigger modeling, reverse geocoding, and traffic 
simulation to model wildfire evacuation as a coupled human-environmental system” (Li D. , 
Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-Environmental System Using Triggers, 
2016). The research also explores the spatiotemporal dynamics behind evacuation timing by 
coupling fire and traffic simulation models, where the integration of the two analysis sets triggers 
to the wildfire evacuation based on the estimated evacuation times through simulation and 
planning (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-Environmental System 
Using Triggers, 2016). In addition to the broad analysis, Li proposes a  model for wildfire 
evacuation that is a spatiotemporal GIS framework to couple fire and traffic simulation models 
to set triggers during such event (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-
Environmental System Using Triggers, 2016). Similarly, to our analysis and transportation 
knowledge, Li states that “with the increase of evacuation travel demand, more evacuees will be 
exposed to fire risk” (Li D. , Modeling Wildfire Evacuation As Coupled Human-Environmental 
System Using Triggers, 2016). This delays the evacuation causing the exposure to the fire rapidly 
spreading.  
 Similarly, to many studies done for different countries a great example is the study 
conducted by Zang, Lim, and Shaples, where they modeled spatial patterns of wildfire 
occurrence in South-Eastern Australia. This study consists of identifying the exact locations of 
future occurrences, many U.S. wildfire studies have been done for location of future, but no 
traffic analysis for the movement of residents out of the risk area. Their research shows that 
“wildfires are most likely to occur in mountainous areas, forests, savannahs, and lands with high 
vegetation coverage, and are less likely to occur in grasslands and shrublands” (Zhang, Lim, & 
Sharples, 2015). More studies similarly to Zang’s is the forest risk fire maps in a GIS open source 
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application created by Teodoro and Duarte in Portugal (Teodoro & Duarte, 2012). Municipalities 
in Portugal are required to produce a forest fire risk map annually by the Portuguese Forest 
Authority (Teodoro & Duarte, 2012).  
 Micah Brachman, a student from the University of California - Santa Barbara, researched 
the assumptions related to the empirical data from survey of people in Santa Barbara (Brachman, 
2012). Similar to what Brachman mentions in her study that there are mathematical models 
related to the hazard conditions of the regions, road topology, and population characteristics, 
there is a need to challenge those mathematical methods and assumptions with real time data 
(Brachman, 2012). Even though Brachman challenges through surveys, our research overlaps 
with the idea of whether residents choose to “stay-or-go” when they are living in a mandatory 
evacuation area. Brachman’s analysis uses survival analysis to “analyze empirical evacuation 
route data and determine which wayfinding strategies were employed by Jesusita Fire evacuees” 
(Brachman, 2012). 
 Many literatures focus on the development of a certain methodology to identify different 
areas of planning and analysis in different evacuation situations. According to the study 
presented in Church and Cova’s literature, their “Critical Cluster Model”, which can be used “to 
identify small areas or neighborhoods which have high ratios of population to exit capacity” 
(Chruch & Cova, 2000). This model can be used to produce maps of evacuation risks or 
susceptibility in a GIS (Geographical Information Systems) system (Chruch & Cova, 2000).  
 The empirical knowledge and previous experience of different studies and analysis help 
planning for evacuation easier, but in the case of population growth the real meaning and purpose 
of effective and successful evacuation. Han, Yuan, and Urbanik II’s study presents different 
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measures of effectiveness (MOE) for evacuation (Han, Yuan, & Urbanik II, 2007). The MOEs 
presented where from different literatures previously done, which were “implicitly assumed or 
explicitly defined” and an optimization of the MOEs is compiled and presented depending on 
different situations (Han, Yuan, & Urbanik II, 2007). 
 On the other hand, population growth and residential areas expansion is a primary 
concern when it comes to infrastructure and planning for an effective evacuation. Cova, 
Theobald, Norman III, and Siebeneck’s study analyzed different communities and locations of 
wildfire histories that have a pattern. According to this study, the pattern consists in sharing “a 
unique vulnerability in that all residents may not be able to evacuate in scenarios with short 
warning” (Cova, Theobald, Norman III, & Siebeneck, 2011). This study helps pinpoint the areas 
of vulnerability with the wind patterns during certain time of the year in the west coast, especially 
in California. 
 Another important observation in wildfire evacuations is the ability to consider the fire 
management area of an evacuation. McCaffrey, Rhodes, and Stidham’s studied four different 
communities in the United States “where some alternative to mass evacuation during a wildfire 
was being considered” (McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2013). The results of this study is rather 
interesting because while there are residents interested in increasing safety and reducing 
uncertainty for emergency responders tend to think that the best approach is a mass evacuation 
(McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2013). On the other hand, those who were interested in the 
same, but for “homeowners tend to think that alternative responses were valid option” 
(McCaffrey, Rhodes, & Stidham, 2013). This is one of the mayor differences that hurricane and 
wildfire evacuations have, the use of emergency responders is a primary concern and priority to 
these communities. 
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California has limited studies on wildfires, the demand is related more towards the 
environmental factors rather than the transportation impacts. On the other hand, Australia and 
many foreign countries have studied other factors and impacts of a wildfire, such as engaging 
and preparing the homeowners in these events. According to a group of researchers starting with 
Stephens and Adams, California and many other states in the U.S. should learn from the studies 
done in Australia (Stephens, et al., 2009). The researchers imply that “U.S. society has attempted 
to accommodate many of the natural hazards inherent to the landscapes that we inhabit; by 
examining the Australian model, we may approach a more sustainable coexistence with fire as 
well” (Stephens, et al., 2009).  
 The graphical analysis of this research can be related to that of Wolshon, Archibald, and 
McNeil’s. There are many factors that are included in such graphs that help reflect the day of the 
week and the time of day variations. These variations during evacuations show a distorted 
increase during an evacuation and re-entry, but a distorted decrease during the disasters. 
According to Archibald and McNeil, “[g]raphing traffic against time provides insights into how 
much variation occurs in these patterns and helps to identify disruptions”, such as congestion 
assumptions. These assumptions are related to bottlenecks, construction downstream, closed exit 
ramps, accidents, among others (Archibald & McNeil, 2012). In these graphical analyses the use 
of conservation of flow to estimate vehicles evacuated are important because the “traffic counts 
can be used to estimate the population evacuated” (Archibald & McNeil, 2012). As explained in 
the previous sections, the use of traffic recorders or detectors count the number of vehicles that 
pass-through a given location over a specific period of time. As stated in this literature, when 
acquiring enough counters, the analysis of the traffic demand of the evacuation can be gathered 
to “pinpoint exactly how many vehicles left a given area in the specified period” (Archibald & 
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McNeil, 2012). This connects back to what our study’s procedure will be on, analyzing graphicly 
the change in volume over time given the analyst the opportunity to evaluate the disruptions and 
illustrate how effective are the evacuation announcements from the moment residents decide to 
evacuate.        
The equations from the Archibald and McNeil’s study is shown below to calculate the 
change in vehicle count, number of evacuees, percentage occupancy of seasonal units, 
number of people in each and the percentage calculated (Archibald & McNeil, 2012). 
1. How the change in vehicle count for an area can be calculated using the inbound and 
outbound counts: 
∆𝑛 = ∑ 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 (𝐼𝑛𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 − 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 
2. Finding the number of evacuees using the number of vehicles that evacuated (∆𝑛), 
assuming that the number of vehicles per household is the same for the residents and the visitors: 
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑠 = |∆𝑛| 𝑥 
(𝑃𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑)
(𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑)
 
3. Identifying the percentage occupancy of seasonal units and the number of people in each: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ %𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 (#𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠) 𝑥 𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 
4. Calculating the percentage evacuated using the number of evacuees and the total 
population of the region: 
%𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
(𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑠)
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)
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Due to population growth and urban development expansion during the past decade, 
analysts consider evacuations to start to become more difficult. According to Pel, Bliemer, and 
Hoogendoorn, “the frequency and intensity of natural disasters [have] been increasing over the 
past decades”; their conclusion is based on two studies that were done by William H. Hooke in 
2000 and Ross T. Newkirk 2001, (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012). These studies focused 
on many regions in the world and summarized in giving importance in investing on “efficient 
disaster management strategies” for hazard prone regions, (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012). 
There are different factors to consider for a successful evacuation, such as “warning time, 
response time, information and instructions dissemination procedure, evacuation routes, traffic 
flow conditions, dynamic traffic control measures, etc.” (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012). 
This is the guidance towards the tempo-spatial analysis considering government announcements 
for mandatory and voluntary evacuations. In addition, Pel, Bliemer, and Hoogendoorn suggested 
that “the speed, intensity, and track of a hurricane or wildfire inappropriately [has] not effect on 
travel demand” of the region during evacuations (Pel, Bliemer, & Hoogendoorn, 2012). There 
are many models like the model shown in this study that gives a conceptual framework of a 
repeated binary logit model to calculate the amount of people that evacuated and stayed.   
 A review of the literature has shown that currently there is no way to effectively compare 
evacuations and re-entries, as well as traffic coverages through the area(s) that were evacuated. 
Managing reentry can be challenging. In contrast to evacuation where destinations are dispersed, 
in reentry, traffic converges to the area(s) that were evacuated. These areas may have suffered 
damage, have debris issues, and utility outages (Zhang, Wolshon, Herrera, & Parr, 2019). These 
parameters observed will help government agencies to be prepared. Numerous studies have 
reportedly low compliance with official reentry plans: 38% for Hurricane Ike (Siebeneck, 
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Lindell, Prater, Wu, & Huang) , 46.4% returning on or after scheduled return date for Hurricane 
Rita (Siebeneck & Cova, An Assesment Return Entry Process for Hurricane Rita 2005.), and no 
studies for wildfires reentry. Assuming that the reason there is a lack of studies done for reentries 
during wildfire events is because of the great damage to property that this natural disaster causes. 
Considering this relatively low compliance, it is important for researchers to investigate and 
agencies to understand when evacuees will return and the volume in which they do so. The use 
of this spatial-temporal analysis and literature will help the four phases of disaster management: 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. This study uses aggregate data to improve this 
understanding. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology 
Broadly, the research methodology utilized traffic count data taken from across the state 
of Florida and California to investigate the auto-based evacuation response and reentry of 
communities from both Hurricane Irma (2017), Michael (2018), Tubbs Fire (2017), and Thomas 
Fire (2018). The first part of the methodology was to process traffic count data used in the 
analysis. The second part of the methodology discussion demonstrates how this data was used 
to estimate the start and end of the auto-based evacuation, the loading and peaking characteristics 
of the auto-based evacuation, and the total number of vehicles used in the evacuation process, as 
well as the effective start and end of the auto-based reentry. 
Data Collection and Processing 
The SunGuide program gathers roadway data from across the State of Florida. Traffic 
counts are reported hourly and archived for analysis. There are 255 SunGuide locations; each 
provides bidirectional hourly counts. For the analysis of the hurricane Irma evacuation, data was 
collected, cataloged, and processed for a 36-day period beginning August 27th, 2017 and ending 
October 1st, 2017. The analysis of Hurricane Michael encompasses the same locations and 
included a 14-day period that began October 1st, 2018 and concluded October 14th, 2018. 
The evacuation analysis focuses on five general regions of Florida: Naples, the Florida 
Keys, Southeast Florida, and Tampa were analyzed during the Hurricane Irma evacuation and 
sections of the Florida Panhandle were investigated for the hurricane Michael evacuation. Naples 
and the Florida Keys were included in the analysis because hurricane Irma made landfall in both 
regions. Southeast Florida was included in the analysis because this region of Florida is the most 
heavily populated and was directly in the path of Hurricane Irma, as previously shown Figure 8. 
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The Tampa region was also included in the analysis because it too is heavily populated and was 
Irma’s path. Unlike Irma, Hurricane Michael showed a consistent and ultimately accurate storm 
path projection, leading to the evacuation being focused in the panhandle region. For this reason, 
only one analysis zone was investigated for Hurricane Michael. 
The SunGuide data collection sites were selected to encompass each of the five regions, 
similar to the way a cordon line identifies the inner and outer limits of a region. The SunGuide 
locations and analysis regions were provided in Figure 8. Given the relative location of each 
count station, directional counts were classified as “inbound”, into the region, or “outbound”, 
out of the region. Drawing a cordon line around a major city, a net increase in the number of 
inbound vehicles would be expected in the morning, while the opposite would be expected in 
the afternoon, for a normal commute. As such, it should also be expected that the number of 
vehicles entering the region in the morning should be approximately equal to the number exiting 
in the evening. A failure to maintain this equilibrium would result in an overall net increase or 
decrease of vehicles within the cordoned area. However, during an evacuation, this pattern is 
broken resulting in the number of vehicles exits significantly outnumbering vehicle entries.  
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Similarly, the Performance Measurement Systems (PEMs) Data Source is a Caltrans 
(State of California) system that collects and organizes all of the detectors in an area where these 
detectors are installed. The assumed limits chosen for the wildfire data analysis in this study are 
near the areas where there was mandatory evacuations in a state road that had reliable data points. 
Tubbs Fire data was collected, classified, and processed for a 36-day period beginning October 
1st, 2017 and ending November 5th, 2017 northeast of Santa Rosa, CA. The analysis of Thomas 
Figure 8. SunGuide Data Collections and Analysis Regions. 
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Fire evacuation encompasses the west coast of  Los Angeles locations and included a 26-day 
period that began November 27th, 2018 and concluded December 22nd, 2018. 
The evacuation analysis focuses on four counties of California: Napa, Somona, Ventura, 
and Santa Barbara were analyzed during the Tubbs Fire and Thomas Fire evacuations. These 
regions were included because of the locations of the fires and because these fires were the 
biggest destructive fires in 2017 and 2018, as previously shown Figure 9 and 10. The PEMs data 
collection sites were selected to encompass each of the four regions, similar to the way a cordon 
line identifies the inner and outer limits of a region. The PEMs locations and analysis regions 
were provided in Figure 9 and 10. Given the relative location of each count station, directional 
counts were classified as “inbound”, into the region, or “outbound”, out of the region. Drawing 
a cordon line around a major city, a net increase in the number of inbound vehicles would be 
expected in the morning, while the opposite would be expected in the afternoon, for a normal 
commute similar to the hurricane evacuations. Similarly to the hurricane “inbounds” and 
“outbounds”, it should also be expected that the number of vehicles entering the region in the 
morning should be approximately equal to the number exiting in the evening. A failure to 
maintain this equilibrium would result in an overall net increase or decrease of vehicles within 
the cordoned area. However, during an evacuation, this pattern is broken resulting in the number 
of vehicles exits significantly outnumbering vehicle entries.  
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Figure 9. Tubbs Fire (2017) PEMs detector for data collection shown as a 
yellow symbol. 
Figure 10. Thomas Fire (2018) PEMs detector for data collection shown as a yellow symbol. 
     Cordon Points 
     Cordon Points 
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Evacuation Analysis 
Fundamentally, the change in the number of vehicles within a defined cordon boundary 
can be measured by adding the number vehicles crossing a cordon line into the area and 
subtracting the number of vehicles exiting. This simple method can determine the change in the 
number of vehicles within the boundary area. By establishing a cordon line around an evacuating 
city or region, it is possible to estimate the net change in vehicles, i.e., the number of evacuating 
vehicles. Let the number of vehicles entering an evacuation area 𝐴 from location 𝑖 along the 
cordon line for area 𝐴, over time interval 𝑡, be represented by 𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴. Likewise, let the number of 
vehicles exiting 𝐴 at 𝑖, during 𝑡, be represented by the variable 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴. The start of the evacuation 
is noted as 𝜏 and the recovery time, after the evacuation and reentry of 𝐴, as 𝑇. The net change 
in vehicles can be calculated at any time 𝑡, as ∆𝑡
𝐴 in Equation 1: 
∆𝑡
𝐴= ∑ (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴−𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴)𝐼𝑖=1        (1) 
In practice, roadway detectors along major routes capture the number of vehicles passing 
in each direction (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴−𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴). A cordon line can be delineated by connecting detector 
locations to encompass a city or region. In general, daily commuting patterns tend to result in 
approximately the same number of vehicles entering and exiting a region during any 24-hour 
period 𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴 = 0 = Σ𝑡=1 
24 Σ𝑖=1
𝐼 (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴 − 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴). While seasonal variations or special circumstances 
often occur that violate this assumption, the daily equilibrium tends to remain relatively in 
balance. Determining the approximate time an evacuation begins (𝜏) and recovery ends (𝑇) has 
been a significant challenge for emergency managers. However, as the traffic pattern changes 
over time, the imbalance caused by the evacuation in favor of outbound vehicles becomes 
evident i.e. Σ𝑡=1
24  ∆𝑡
𝐴< 0. While it remains, difficult to estimate the precise time at which the 
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evacuation begins and recovery ends, due to the stochastic nature of driving patterns and 
behaviors, this research shows, to the hour, when the traffic pattern deviated from a typical 
commuting regimen. Therefore, this research defines the start of the auto-based evacuation 𝜏 and 
the recovery time (the end of the reentry) 𝑇 as the start and end times corresponding to a net loss 
in vehicles that is inclusive of the hurricanes landfall time, 𝑡1. 
The total number of evacuating vehicles for area 𝐴 is calculated as the minimum value 
of the cumulative ∆𝑡
𝐴. The clearance point of the auto-based evacuation (𝑡𝑐𝑝) is the time at which 
the cumulative ∆𝑡
𝐴 reaches its minimum value (i.e., when the most evacuees have exited the 
cordoned area. For a hurricane evacuation, the clearance point typically occurs before or at 
landfall (𝜏 < 𝑡𝑐𝑝 ≤ 𝑡𝑙). The clearance time (𝑡𝑐𝑡) is the duration between the start of the 
evacuation and the clearance point (𝑡𝑐𝑡 = 𝑡𝑐𝑝 − 𝜏). The peak evacuation traffic is seen when ∆𝑡
𝐴 
reaches a minimum value. The peak evacuation hour 𝑡𝑝, is the hour that sees ∆𝑡
𝐴 reach a minimum 
value. This minimum could then be considered the peak evacuation exit volume of the area. 
Evacuation peak demand flow rate and evacuation peak hour factor can also be calculated, if the 
detectors report 15-minut count intervals or shorter. 
By considering the maximum value of the cumulative ∆𝑡
𝐴 as 100 percent of the auto-base 
evacuation demand, then 𝑡𝑐𝑡 represents the clearance time for 100 percent of the auto-based 
evacuees. It is therefore possible to estimate the clearance time for any proportion of the auto-
based evacuation. For example, the clearance time corresponding to 90 percent of the auto-based 
evacuation 𝑡𝑐𝑡90 is the time at which 90 percent of the cumulative ∆𝑡
𝐴 minimum is achieved. In 
this fashion, it is possible to estimate vehicle exit rates and id travel time data is available, these 
exit rates could be adjusted to estimate vehicle-loading rates. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The results focused on the development and analysis of figures that show ∆𝑡
𝐴 and the 
cumulative ∆𝑡
𝐴 for the Florida and California communities affected by hurricanes Irma and 
Michael as well as the wildfires. These figures were used to determine the total number of 
evacuating vehicles, start of the auto-based evacuation (𝜏), and end of the recovery period (𝑇), 
clearing point (𝑡𝑐𝑝), the peak evacuation volume (∆𝑡
𝐴minimum) and hour (𝑡𝑝). The results also 
discussed the development of evacuation time estimate curves, which show the cumulative 
percent evacuating each region over time. For these curves, it was possible to estimate the 90 
percent clearance time 𝑡𝑐𝑡90, 50 percent clearance time 𝑡𝑐𝑡50, etc. Finally, the results show how 
data collected from the evacuation of the Florida Keys was used to substantiate prior survey 
results from the region. 
Evacuation Figures for Florida Hurricanes 
Figure 9 shows the evacuation and reentry traffic resulting from Hurricane Irma 
evacuation of the Naples, FL region. The primary y-axis displays ∆𝑡
𝐴, the number of evacuated 
vehicles hourly. The secondary y-axis displays the cumulative number of evacuating vehicles 
for all time periods between the start of the evacuation (𝜏) and end of reentry (𝑇). The x-axis is 
time, in hours. Landfall 𝑡𝑙 is shown with a thick vertical line for September 10
th, 2017 at 15:00 
when the storm made landfall on Marco Island, FL. The figure shows a typical example week 
traffic pattern to demonstrate the disparity between the evacuation and routine conditions. In 
general, the daily traffic shows a morning peak of traffic entering the region (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴) and 
an afternoon peak where the vehicles are leaving the region (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴) . The evacuation 
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Figure 11. Naples Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis 
traffic shows net losses in the number of vehicles prior to landfall and net increases, post landfall, 
representing re-entry. The maximum traffic demand periods during both the evacuation and 
reentry are shown on the figure as the peaks and valleys of the evacuation traffic line. The figure 
shows these points of interest. It is important to note that the cordon line, which encircled the 
Naples Region, did not constitute a true cordon, as data for many smaller roads were not 
available. However, the cordon likely captures the vast majority of evacuees. Naples saw a net 
decrease of 123,202 vehicles in the days leading up to the storm. The evacuation of Naples began 
approximately 126 hours before the landfall and concluded 122 hours later (just for hours before 
the eye wall of the storm crossed onto Marco Island). This was unexpected finding and suggests 
the unpredictable path may have delayed the decision of whether and when to evacuate. The 
peak evacuation demand occurred 28 hours before landfall at 11:00 and the reentry process took 
169 hours (over seven days) to conclude. 
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The figure for the Florida Keys is shown in Figure 10. unlike the other four regions, the 
Florid Keys have only one primary evacuation route and therefore the analysis represents data 
collected from only one detector location. The analysis found that 40,731 vehicles crossed the 
cordon line, not to return until after the storm. The evacuation began approximately 120 hours 
before landfall (on Cudjoe Key Sept. 10, 2017 at 9:00) and concluded 108 hours later. The peak 
evacuation demand occurred 89 hours before landfall at 16:00. The reentry of the 40,731 vehicles 
required 484 hours or 20 days and four hours after landfall. This was likely because many 
residents of the lower keys were not permitted to return home for several days. 
Figure 11 shows the evacuation figure for Southeast Florida. This cordon line included 
nine detector locations along the major highways and freeways exiting a region. Again, it was 
not possible to conduct a true cordon, as many lower capacity streets were not available for 
analysis. Southeast Florida saw 276,052 vehicles leave the area in the days leading up to the 
storm. The evacuation began 95 hours before landfall on Cudjoe Key and concluded 62 hours 
later. The peak demand occurred 66 hours before landfall at 15:00. The analysis also found that 
20,282 vehicles (7.35 percent) actually entered Southeast Florida, after it had cleared. That is to 
say after the cumulative change in volume reached its minimum value before landfall, over 
20,000 vehicles travelled into and stayed in Southeast Florida as an evacuation destination. This 
was likely a combination of two reasons: 1) Southeast Florida has the largest, therefore many 
people would have friends and family in the area, marking it a desirable destination after the 
storm’s path had changed. 2) It was likely that some evacuees, after seeing the updated 
projections returned home before the storm made landfall. The evacuation reentry took seven 
days and 23 hours (191 hours) to complete.
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Figure 12. Florida Keys Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis. 
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Figure 13. Southeast Florida Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis. 
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Figure 12 shows the evacuation plot for the Tampa Region of Florida. The Tampa area 
cordon included nine detector locations. In the days leading up to the evacuation. Tampa 
experienced a net increase in vehicles between Tuesday morning and the start of the evacuation 
on the following Friday afternoon. The number of vehicles within the Tampa region increased 
by 20,768 over this period. This may suggest Tampa was a desirable evacuation destination prior 
to the storm’s path change or it could simply be residents returning from the Labor Day break 
on September 4th, 2017. In either event, the Tampa area experienced a net loss of 135,080 
vehicles by the time Hurricane Irma made landfall. The evacuation began approximately 47 
hours before landfall and concluded 57 hours later (10 hours after the storm reached Cudjoe 
Key). The peak evacuation demand occurred just 21 hours prior to landfall at 10:00 and the 
reentry took just four days and four hours (100 hours) to complete. 
Figure 13 shows the evacuation from Hurricane Michael in the Florida Panhandle 
Region. Its cordon line consisted of seven detector locations on the major exit routes of the area. 
Severe damage to the power grid resulted in the loss of service to many of the data collection 
sites. Leading up to and after the storm’s landfall. Detector failure began at midnight of October 
10,2018 and continued (on and off) until the data collection period ended. This shown in the 
figure as a yellow overlay depicting times of poor data quality. Prior to the data collection failure, 
16,370 vehicles were recorded during the evacuation 13 hours before landfall. At the time of 
landfall, the remaining detectors indicated that 18,302 vehicles had exited. However, these 
additional exits were recorded while nearly half of the seven detector locations were inoperable. 
In reality, it is likely the evacuation encompassed more than 20,000 vehicles. Still, the auto-
based evacuation began 187 hours prior to landfall. Due to the detector error, it was not possible 
to determine the exact time of the clearance point but based on the data available it may have 
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occurred just two hours prior to landfall. No estimate for the evacuating vehicles could return. 
The evacuation peaked 42 hours before landfall at 8:00. 
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Figure 14. Tampa Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis. 
Figure 15. Florida Panhandle Region Evacuation from Hurricane Micheal Traffic Analysis. 
 
 
 
-20,000
-15,000
-10,000
-5,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
-1000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
C
u
m
. V
e
h
ic
le
s
V
e
h
ic
le
s
Evacuation: Florida Panhandle Region / Hurricane Michael
Landfall Evac. Traffic Example Week Cum. Evac. Traffic Poor Data Quality
-120000
-80000
-40000
0
40000
80000
120000
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
C
u
m
. V
e
h
ilc
e
s
V
e
h
ic
le
s
Evacuation & Reentry: Tampa
Landfall Evacuation Traffic Example Week Evacuation Traffic
46 
 
 
 
Evacuation and Reentry Time Estimates 
Figure 7 shows the evacuation time estimates for the five study regions. The y-axis shows 
the cumulative percent of vehicles exiting the cordoned area. The x-axis shows the number of 
hours, which have elapsed since the start of the evacuation (𝑇 − 𝜏). From this figure, the 
evacuation clearance time may be estimated for any cumulative percent evacuated. For example, 
the time needed to evacuate 50 percent of the residents of the Florida Keys was 34 hours. Likewise, 
99 percent of evacuees in the Naples Region were able to clear the area within 104 hours, as 
compared to the last one percent, which required an additional 18 hour. The figure also presents a 
comparison of the exiting rate and by extension the loading rate for each region. The figure 
suggests that Southeast Florida and the Tampa region mobilized quickly as compared to the Florida 
Keys and Naples Region. However, regions showing slower mobilization began comparatively 
earlier than those with longer loading rates did. The mobilization in response to Hurricane Michael, 
on the other hand spanned several days before spiking two days prior to landfall. This was likely 
because the projected storm path did not deviate much in days leading up to landfall. This could 
have allowed residents in coastal areas to evacuate earlier. However, as the storm approached, it 
rapidly intensified. These later forecasts were likely the cause of large evacuation response closer 
to landfall and the resulting spike in network loading. With the exception of the Florida Keys, the 
evacuation reentry generally tended to be more gradual than the evacuation itself. The Florida 
Keys experienced severe damage resulting from the storm which led to curfews, travel restrictions, 
and ultimately the prolonged reentry curve shown in the figure. Half of the population of Southeast 
Florida that evacuated by vehicle did so within 23 hours after the evacuation began. However, it 
was not for another 120 hours that half of the population reentered. Therefore, the average evacuee 
from Southeast Florida was displaced for up to five days. Using this same approach, 50 percent of 
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the Naples auto-based evacuees were displaced for 120 hours as well. The displacement time for 
the 50th percentile of the auto-based evacuees from the Tampa Region was only 64 hours whereas 
the average Florida Keys resident was displaced for 278 hours, over 11.5 days.
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Figure 16. Evacuation Time Estimates 
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Summary Results 
Table 1 provides summary data, pulled from each region’s evacuation figure as well as 
the evacuation time estimate analysis. The table shows that Southeast Florida experienced the 
largest net loss in vehicles. This was expected as this region has the highest population and was 
likely to see the greatest number of evacuees. In general, the evacuations began several days 
before the storm made landfall. However, Tampa did not begin to evacuate substantially until 47 
hours before landfall. It is likely that the Tampa evacuees did not make their decisions to 
evacuate until much later because the storm was originally predicted to hit the Southeast Florida 
and only have a marginal impact in the Tampa area. The evacuation from Hurricane Michael 
shows evacuees leaving the region over one week in advance of the storm. The Florida Keys, 
Southeast Florida and the Panhandle saw the peak evacuation hour, two to three days in advance 
of the landfall. This is a significant finding because it suggests that hurricane warnings and 
evacuation notification were taken seriously and acted upon. However, Naples and Tampa did 
not experience peak demand until 28 and 21 hours before the storm arrived, respectively. Again, 
this was likely because of the shifting storm track. Tampa experienced the fastest reentry time 
of just four days and four hours after landfall. Naples and Southeast Florida had similar recovery 
times of just over a week. The Florida Keys required more than 20 days for the traffic patterns 
to recover. This was likely because the keys were the hardest hit and access was restricted to the 
lower keys for nearly three weeks. The clearance time was provided for when 50 percent, 90 
percent, 99 percent, and 100 percent of evacuees exited the region. The table shows Naples and 
the Florida Keys has the longest clearance times from Hurricane Irma. It is not likely coincidental 
that these two regions were also the hardest hit by the storm. The clearance time for Hurricane 
Michael was estimated to be significantly longer than any region impacted by Irma. The 
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extended clearance time may suggest that while some evacuees decided to leave early, others 
departed only once the storm had intensified. This likely resulted in a two-phase evacuation, one 
for those who evacuated as a result of the first storm projection and one for those who decided 
to evacuate after the second. Southeast Florida and Tampa had significantly shorter clearance 
times despite evacuating more vehicles. This was likely because these areas have more, higher 
capacity roads and freeways and their evacuations started much later when compared to the other 
regions. 
Table 1. Summary of Hurricane Evacuation Analysis 
Regions 
Total Veh 
 
All Times Shown Relative to Landfall 
Evac. 
Initiated 
(𝝉) 
Peak 
Hours 
(𝒕𝒑) 
Evac. 
Reentry 
(𝑻) 
Clearance time (𝒕𝒄𝒕) 
50% 90% 99% 100% 
FL Keys 40,731 5d, 0hr 3d, 17hr 20d, 4hr 34 73 92 104 
S.E. FL 276,052 2d, 23hr 2d, 18hr 7d, 1hr 23 42 48 53 
Naples Region 123,202 5d, 6hr 1d 4hr 7d, 1hr 68 97 104 122 
Tampa Region 130,407 1d, 23hr 0d, 21hr 4d, 4hr 17 30 41 47 
FL Panhandle 
(Michael) 
16,370 7d, 19hr 1d, 18hr N/A* 156 166 173 185* 
*exact value not able to be determine. 
 
 
Comparison with Survey Results 
In response to the active hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, the Florida State 
Legislators authorized the development of regional evacuation studies. Contracting with 
Florida’s Regional Planning Councils, the Statewide Regional Evacuation Study Program 
(SRESP) was developed to support and update local government emergency management plans. 
As part of the SRESP, a series of stated choice surveys were conducted to better understand 
evacuation modeling and shelter planning. The behavior assumptions collected as part of that 
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survey were: evacuation rate, out-of-county trips, type of refuge, percent of available vehicles, 
and evacuation timing. Surveys were conducted with 400 residents in each of the Florida’s 67 
counties. 
To demonstrate further the application of the proposed methodology, the results of the 
SRESP surveys were analyzed to estimate the auto-based evacuation response of a Category 4 
hurricane landfall in the lower keys. These results were then compared to the values generated 
by Hurricane Irma (a Category 4 hurricane that made landfall on Cudjoe Key). The analysis first 
investigated the number of evacuating vehicles predicted by the SRESP while the second 
assessed the evacuation timing curve results. The 2017 Census data were used to calculate the 
number of site-built and mobile homes of the Florida Keys region. Then the SRESP survey 
results were used to estimate the evacuation participation rate, percent of the vehicles used, and 
the number of available vehicles. Through this process, the number of evacuating vehicles could 
be estimated for a hypothetical storm. Further, the SRESP forecast three evacuation timing 
scenarios (fast response, normal response, and slow response). These scenarios represent a 24-
hour mobilization time for evacuees. However, based on the results already discussed, the 
evacuation of the Florida Keys took several days. 
Table 2 shows the estimated number of vehicles evacuating the Florida Keys because of 
a Category 4 hurricane landfall in the lower keys. To remain consistent with Hurricane Irma, 
these results assume a Category 4 scenario for Key West and the Lower Keys, a Category 3 
storm in the middle keys, and a Category 2 storm in the Upper Keys. The analysis suggests up 
to approximately 53,781 vehicles may be used during the evacuation. The analysis of the 
Hurricane Irma results found 40,731 vehicles. A number of factors likely contributed to the more 
than 10,000 vehicle disparity between the predicted value and the observed. The most significant 
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of which was the SRESP study stating, “the planning assumptions for the evacuation rates are 
the maximum probable rates” (Baker, 2010). Therefore, the evacuation values estimated by the 
SRESP survey represent the upper limit of evacuees from any storm likely to affect the region. 
In this sense, the SRESP was accurate in that planning values were not surpassed by the Irma 
evacuation and were reasonably accurate. In addition, the SRESP results were based om surveys 
conducted in 2007 and 2008, nearly ten years before hurricane Irma. Updated survey results 
might lead to more accurate predictions. 
Table 2. SRESP Estimate of the Number of Vehicles Evacuating the Florida Keys 
Keys 
Region 
Households ¹ Evac. Rate ² 
Vehicles Use Rate ² 
Error! Reference source 
not found. 
Vehicles. 
Avail.³  
Evac. Vehicles 
Built Mobile Built Mobile Built Mobile  Built Mobile 
Upper 15,789 1,886 50% 75% 75% 80% 1.8 10,658 2,037 
Middle 6,929 1,338 70% 85% 75% 80% 1.8 6,548 1,638 
Lower 7,459 1,373 80% 95% 75% 80% 2.6 11,637 2,714 
West 15,714 2,859 80% 95% 80% 85% 1.5 15,086 3,463 
        Total Vehicles  =   53,781 
¹  U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: Monroe County, Florida. (2018). Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/monroecountyflorida 
²  Baker, E. (2010). Statewide Regional Evacuation Study Program: Volume 2-11 South Florida Region Regional Behavioral 
Analysis. Retrieved from United States, Florida Division of Emergency management, South Florida Regional Planning 
Council: http://www.sfrpc.com/SRESP Web/Vol2-11.pdf 
³  Downs, P., Prusaitis, S., Germain, J., & Baker, J. (2010). Statewide Regional Evacuation Program: Volume 3-11 South 
Florida Region Regional Behavioral Survey Report. Retrieved from United States, Florida Division of Emergency 
Management, South Florida Regional Planning Council: https://www.sffrpc.com/SRESP Web/Vol3-11.pdf 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the three evacuation planning curves developed as part of the SRESP and 
the cumulative percent of vehicles evacuating the Florida Keys during Hurricane Irma. The x-
axis displays the number of hours relative to government issued, mandatory evacuation orders. 
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Figure 17. Evacuation Timing Curves for the Florida Keys 
The three planning curves represent a slow, normal, and fast evacuation response scenario. 
However, each was complete within a 24-hour period. This was done within the SRESP to 
estimate a severe shift in storm forecast that prompts a shortened window of evacuation. Again, 
representing the more severe conditions which are still probable to occur. In addition, the curve 
resulting from Hurricane Irma was based on the number of vehicles exiting the region, not the 
number of vehicles loading on the road network. Therefore, the planning curves do not account 
for travel time between residents’ homes and the detector location. The figure shows that over 
20 percent of the residents evacuating the Keys did so before mandatory evacuation orders were 
in place. However, the response curves predicted from the SRESP survey show this value to be 
10 percent. In general, the SRESP survey estimated the most severe evacuation projections in 
term s of the number of evacuees and loading, that could reasonably expected to occur. 
Therefore, the values estimated by the SRESP were likely reasonable. It was not unreasonable 
to assume that if Irma’s intensity projection were fixed in the days leading up to landfall, that an 
additional 20,000 vehicles may have been used during the evacuation. 
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Evacuation Figures for California Wildfires 
Figure 20 shows the evacuation and reentry traffic resulting from Tubbs Fire evacuation 
of the Napa and Somona County, CA region. The primary y-axis displays ∆𝑡
𝐴, the number of 
evacuated vehicles hourly. The secondary y-axis displays the cumulative number of evacuating 
vehicles for all time periods between the start of the evacuation (𝜏) and end of reentry (𝑇). The 
x-axis is time, in hours. Landfall 𝑡𝑙 is shown with a thick vertical line for October 8
th, 2017 at 
19:00 when the fire broke out between Kellogg and Calistoga, CA. The figure shows a typical 
example week traffic pattern to demonstrate the disparity between the evacuation and routine 
conditions. In general, the daily traffic shows a morning peak of traffic entering the region 
(𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴) and an afternoon peak where the vehicles are leaving the region (𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡
𝐴 > 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝐴). 
The evacuation traffic shows net losses in the number of vehicles prior to the start of the fire and 
net increases, post fire, representing re-entry. The maximum traffic demand periods during both 
the evacuation and reentry are shown on the figure as the peaks and valleys of the evacuation 
traffic line. The figure shows these points of interest. It is important to note that chosen detectors, 
which are located near the evacuation zones, did not constitute the only access to the evacuation, 
as data for many smaller roads were not available. However, the chosen detectors likely capture 
the vast majority of evacuees. Part of Somona and Napa counties saw a net decrease of 43,000 
vehicles in the days after the fire started. The evacuation began approximately 48 hours after the 
fire started and the evacuation did not conclude since there was not enough information to 
evaluate the reentry. The peak evacuation demand occurred 10 hours after the fire broke out.  
This was unexpected finding and suggests that since the location were the fire start is in a 
vegetated area the closest residential area is southwest with about 6.38 miles away from the 
origin of the fire. The reentry start was not able to be evaluated through the traffic analysis since 
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residents are not going to return to burnt properties where everything is considered to be lost. 
Figure 18 shows the nearby fires that caused an increase in traffic prior to the start of the fire.  
 
Figure 18. Fires nearby the Tubbs Fire that occurred either prior or subsequently after Tubbs Fire. 
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Figure 19. Napa and Somona County Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis for Tubbs Fire (2017) 
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Figure 20. Santa Barbara and Ventura County Evacuation and Reentry Traffic Analysis for Thomas Fire (2018) 
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Figure 21 shows the evacuation and reentry traffic resulting from Thomas Fire (2018) 
evacuation of the Ventura and Santa Barbara County, CA region. The primary y-axis (∆𝑡
𝐴), 
secondary y-axis (evacuation beginning: 𝜏; end of reentry: 𝑇), x-axis (t – hours), fire start (𝑡𝑙) 
for December 4th, 2018 when the fire broke out west of Steckle Park in the area of Los Angeles, 
CA. The figure shows a typical example week traffic pattern to demonstrate the disparity 
between the evacuation and routine conditions. The evacuation traffic shows net losses in the 
number of vehicles prior to the start of the fire and net increases, post fire, representing re-entry. 
The maximum traffic demand periods during both the evacuation and reentry are shown on the 
figure as the peaks and valleys of the evacuation traffic line. The figure shows these points of 
interest. It is important to note that chosen detectors, which are located near the evacuation zones, 
did not constitute the only access to the evacuation, as data for many smaller roads were not 
available. However, the chosen detectors likely capture the vast majority of evacuees.  
Part of Ventura and Santa Barbara counties saw a net decrease of 120,000 vehicles in the 
days after the fire started. The evacuation began approximately 2 days and 3 hours after the fire 
started and the evacuation did not conclude since there was not enough information to evaluate 
the reentry. This was unexpected finding and suggests that since the location were the fire start 
is in a vegetated area the closest residential area is Santa Paula with about 5 miles away from the 
origin of the fire. Figure 19 shows the nearby fires that caused an increase in traffic prior to the 
start of the fire. The peak evacuation demand occurred 3 days after the fire broke out and the 
reentry process was not able to be determine since the graphs do not show vehicles volumes. 
The reentry start was not able to be evaluated through the traffic analysis since residents are not 
going to return to burnt properties where everything is considered to be lost. Figure 19 shows 
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the nearby fires that caused an increase in traffic prior to the start of the fire. According to 
Shatkin, more than 4,000 firefighters were needed to extinguish the Thomas Fire (Shatkin, 2017). 
Table 2 provides summary data of the traffic analysis illustrated in Figures 21.  
Table 3. Summary of Wildfire Evacuation Analysis 
*exact value not able to be determined 
 
 
Regions 
All Times Shown Relative to Fire Start 
Evac. Initiated (𝝉) Peak Hours (𝒕𝒑) Evac. Reentry (𝑻) 
Tubbs Fire (2017) 1d, 23hr 0d, 10hr N/A* 
Thomas Fire (2018) 2d, 3hr 3d, 0hr N/A* 
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Figure 21. Cumulative Percentage of Auto-Based trips comparing Tubbs and Thomas Fires in the state of 
California 
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Figure 22. Fires nearby the Thomas Fire that occurred either prior or subsequently after Thomas Fire. 
Figure 21 shows the cumulative percent of evacuated vehicles since the start of the 
evacuation. Since the analysis does not include a true cordon line, but a screen line point, the 
cumulative amounts of vehicles evacuating are not accurate. However, the actual time shown in 
the following graph is accurate for time it took the vehicles to exit the area. The graph does not 
show the reentry event because the reentry data was not available for analysis since the data is 
not reliable. Tubbs Fire evacuation order and real evacuation event was effective, Figure 21 
shows that the 30 percent of the vehicles started evacuating within 10 hours. On the other hand, 
Thomas Fire evacuation about 30 percent of the vehicles evacuated within 73 hours of the start 
of the evacuation, vehicles took longer to evacuate compared to Tubbs Fire. 
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Chapter V 
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Often, the perceived success of an evacuation, or lack thereof, is based on media reports, 
anecdotal observation or, worse, rumors and social media discussion. In reality, a highly 
effective evacuation could be assumed a failure because of a few limited but highly visible areas 
of congestion. This has suggested the need for a better way to describe and assess large statewide 
evacuations in more systematic and objective ways. Unfortunately, this is not easy to accomplish 
because there are few, if any, data records or performance measures generated that accurately 
and effectively describe the conditions of these events. In fact, there is no standardized 
methodology to quantify the characteristics of an evacuation that is transferable and repeatable 
between state departments of transportation. 
Fortunately, there are many commonly used data measures for analyzing routine 
transportation conditions. The intent of this work was to adapt and apply them to develop a 
method capable of describing mass evacuations. In fact, these methods can also be applied to 
describe evacuation reentry traffic patterns; a historically lightly studied area in practice and 
research. The results of this effort showed these methods could be quite effective to illustrate 
statewide temporal and spatial trends of traffic movement as well as infer evacuee behavioral 
responses and threat interpretation.  
Results of the application of the research methodology showed that the evacuations from 
Hurricane Irma and Michael began several days before landfall. They further suggest that 
Michael evacuees, presumably in low-lying coastal regions prone to flooding, began evacuating 
as much as seven days before landfall. Similarly, vulnerable residents in Florida Keys started 
their evacuations five days before Hurricane Irma’s landfall with nearly 20 percent departing 
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prior to the mandatory evacuation order. This observation was unexpected because prior survey 
results suggested that a two-day loading was most likely (Baker, 2010). In general, the 
evacuations peaked two to three days before landfall and between the hours of 8:00 AM and 
3:00 PM confirming prior research that suggested a preference for morning departures (Lindell, 
Murray-Tuite, Wolshon, & Baker, 2019). In addition, the largest reentry time relative to landfall 
for these 5 regions was 20 days, it can be concluded that since the region was the Florida Keys 
is a vulnerable region in the state of Florida than most regions because of the infrastructures and 
possible flooding and destruction took longer for the residents to travel back to their origin. From 
an emergency preparedness standpoint, these trends are positive and suggest an increased civic 
awareness of hazard risk perception.  
The research also found that half of the auto-based evacuees from Southeast Florida and 
the Naples region were displaced for up to five days. The 50th percentile displacement time for 
Florida Keys residents, which evacuated by car saw significantly longer displacement times of 
over 11 days. When comparing stated choice survey results taken from Florida Keys’ residents, 
the predicted participation rates suggested an upper bound of evacuating vehicles that was 
reasonably accurate to the Hurricane Irma evacuation; given the uncertain path and intensity of 
the storm. 
The wildfire application with the research methodology showed that the evacuations 
from Thomas Fire and Tubbs Fire began shortly after the mandatory evacuation announcement 
was published. With the dry environment that the state of California has the fire spreads quickly 
and for safety evacuees need to make a quicker decision than those evacuees in the state of 
Florida. Tubbs Fire had about 43,000 vehicles that evacuated between October 17th and October 
18th, while there was about 90% of the fire being contained. Tubbs fire mandatory evacuation 
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announcement were given a day after the fire broke out and people did not evacuate until about 
23 hours following the orders, on the emergency preparedness perception, the residents were 
proactive and quickly on the evacuation orders given when dealing with a rapidly fire spread. 
Thomas Fire mandatory evacuation announcement for Ventura County was announced 
December 4th in the evening and about 87,000 residents evacuated between Tuesday and 
Thursday. On the other hand, while the fire started spreading to Santa Barbara County, their 
government officials announced to start evacuating the area on December 21st at 9:00 PM and 
about 95,000 residents evacuated shortly after  (Guerin, 2017). Thomas Fire’s mandatory 
evacuation was given within 24 hours following the fire start and immediately after, the residents 
evacuated within 10 hours of the evacuation orders. 
 These two phenomena have several differences in terms of intensity, paths, resident’s 
preparedness, and traffic pattern. Hurricane Irma and Michael had very different paths which 
affected their evacuation patterns before and during the time evacuation occurrence. These paths 
changed the trajectory of the evacuees on their destination, similarly to the traffic pattern of 
evacuees, the fires surrounding the area affected the traffic pattern of the evacuees in the state of 
California for both wildfires. The intensity of both hurricanes were unique which affected the 
times the evacuees decided to evacuate, however the wildfires had no sign of any affected times 
before the evacuation started. By comparison, the evacuation orders were communicated 
differently in both cases. The hurricane mandatory evacuations were given about 3-5 days in 
advance, which made many residents decide their destination depending on the predicted path 
of the storm and evacuated between 5-7 days prior to landfall. Wildfires’ mandatory evacuations 
were given within a day after the fire and minimal containment started, which is the analysis 
shows that as soon as the orders were given residents evacuated immediately. In addition, the 
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categorized start of the evacuation on both fires were within 24 hours of the evacuation orders. 
Since the results did not show effects of the pre evacuation events for the wildfires but showed 
that as soon as the announcements were communicated, the assumption is that evacuees waited 
for the evacuation orders. On the other hand, the hurricane analysis did show that residents 
evacuated ahead of time, which was categorized as the pre evacuation traffic. In addition, the 
quick response of the wildfire cases compared to the hurricane cases is related to the intensity, 
region, access, and spread of the both phenomenon.   
 Reentry could not be predicted or categorized in any of the Hurricane Michael and 
California wildfire analysis or data because of limited access as well as inconsistent acquired 
data for detectors. There are some assumptions that can made for the wildfire evacuations since 
there were a couple of fires that took place around the studied regions. The analysis shows that 
there was an in-flow number of vehicles during the reentry but were not totaling to the 
commutative numbers of vehicles that were presented before the fire broke out. On the other 
hand, Hurricane Michael’s reentry analysis and data set showed that the acquired information 
was not reliable since the detectors that were considered were working correctly before and some 
time during the storm.   
Recommendations 
This research provides a system for state departments of transportation and emergency 
management officials to analyze future auto-based evacuations. The method also facilitates 
parametric comparisons between evacuation events, an area needed to continue to evolve and 
improve evacuation practice. Standardize measures for hurricane evacuations are needed to 
facilitate systematic evaluations of performance. Future researchers could build upon methods 
presented here to develop a level-of-service (LOS) analysis for emergency evacuations. This 
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would be similar to the way the highway Capacity Manual uses the standardized collection and 
processing of freeway densities for its LOS evaluations. With additional research, the methods 
laid out in this paper could also lead to a more comprehensive understanding of evacuation traffic 
processes and behavioral responses to improve their planning and management. 
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Appendix A 
Hurricane Irma (2017) and Hurricane Michael (2018) 
Graphical Illustrations per Detectors 
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Examples of the micro analysis on the Irma evacuation by sites, congested, not congested, with 
either high or low volumes:  
 
A high volume not congested during evacuation: 
 
A high volume congested during evacuation: 
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A low volume not congested during evacuation: 
 
 
A low volume congested during evacuation: 
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A high volume not congested during re-entry: 
 
A high volume congested during re-entry: 
  
76 
 
 
A low volume not congested during re-entry: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A low volume congested during re-entry: 
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Appendix  
Tubs Fire (2017) and Thomas Fire (2018) 
Graphical Illustrations per Detectors 
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